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Clarke / Lilly and Communication

Since his death at the age of eighty-six in 2001, one can detect a bit of an upsurge
of scholarly interest in John C. Lilly, M.D.1 Up until the present millennium, Lilly
would have been deemed more notorious than renowned, remembered more often
for his later exploits as an extreme psychonaut than for the scientific career
leading up to those self-documented “autobiographies of inner space.” However,
that notoriety followed upon a period of national prominence as a behavioral
physiologist turned dolphin researcher and well-received author of the popular
scientific volumes Man and Dolphin (1961) and The Mind of the Dolphin: A
Nonhuman Intelligence (1967). Then, in a series of professional and personal
memoirs spanning the 1970s—including his first research report on psychedelic
self-exploration, Programming and Metaprogramming in the Human
Biocomputer (1969), as well as The Center of the Cyclone: An Autobiography of
Inner Space (1972), The Dyadic Cyclone: The Autobiography of a Couple, cowritten with Antonietta Lilly (1976), and The Scientist: A Novel Autobiography
(1978)—Lilly chronicled his own transition from lion of the international
scientific mainstream to psychic pioneer scouting the cosmic reaches of the
American counterculture.
The primary theme I will use to map a route through a small selection of
Lilly’s multifarious writings and personal transformations at the cusp of his midlife transition is communication. When Lilly left his position as section head at
the National Institutes of Mental Health (NIMH) in 1958 to concentrate on
dolphin research, he named the private scientific operation he founded, with an
office in Miami, Florida, and laboratories on the island of St. Thomas, the
Communication Research Institute (CRI). While at the NIMH, Lilly had invented
the isolation tank, the flotation chamber and sensory-deprivation device
eventually made famous in the movie Altered States. In the mid-1950s Lilly
embarked on a prolonged course of experimentation, largely upon himself,
exploring the psychic states to be discovered floating in the tank. These
1
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researches formed a parallel experimental track during the years of dolphin
research at CRI, from 1959 to 1968. His applications of LSD within both research
programs began only in the mid-1960s. But their effects, I speculate, were
instrumental in the way that his communications research devoted to interspecies
exchange with dolphins eventually lapsed as he pursued a post-scientific round of
therapeutic, sociopolitical, epistemological, and cosmological messages for his
fellow humans. Lilly’s scientific purpose of theorizing communication through
experiments testing its species boundaries developed into the narration of
phenomenal events beyond the bounds of any common human experience.
However, in the period of the later 1960s I will focus on, Lilly’s theorizations of
communication arrived at innovative applications of first-order cybernetics and
information theory. I will be particularly concerned to develop a systemstheoretical observation of Lilly’s cybernetics of communication in The Mind of
the Dolphin.
The Mind of the Dolphin
On October 24, 1967, Heinz von Foerster, the director of the Biological Computer
Laboratory (BCL) in the Department of Electrical Engineering at the University
of Illinois, prepared to send John Lilly a packet of professional correspondence.
His cover letter began: “Dear John, I cannot tell you how grateful I am for your
sending me your Eighth Annual Report. It gives me new fuel for my perpetual
admiration of your work—if this refueling were necessary at all.”2 To tell from
von Foerster’s letter, it covered his own summary of recent BCL activities and
some BCL reprints and lab reports with an explanation that clarifies to some
extent the object of his admiration: “For us, your work on inter-species symbolic
discourse was most significant in developing the concepts we tried to formulate.”
Von Foerster’s packet also included a $5.00 check in response to a book notice
Lilly had sent along for his popular trade volume just released by Doubleday, The
Mind of the Dolphin: A Nonhuman Intelligence.3
The Mind of the Dolphin is no light read. The preface declares that its
“main ideas and formulations are a theory to scientifically penetrate into the area
of at least one nonhuman mind, that of the bottlenose dolphin” (xi). Left
indeterminate by this statement is whether or not—since the very possibility of
bringing about the contemplated event in actual practice had not yet been
determined—the scientific penetration to be achieved is only theoretical. For
2
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actual as opposed to theoretical penetration into a nonhuman mind would mean a
successful instance of establishing interspecies communication through some as
yet unknown or undiscovered relation by which that nonhuman mind would
reveal its own thoughts to a human interlocutor in a mutually understandable
medium. The eight-year-old project that The Mind of the Dolphin recounts in
1967 details the uncanny aspiration to achieve an unprecedented breakthrough
beyond companionate communion to fully abstract linguistic communication
across species boundaries.
Between 1959 and 1968 Lilly wagered and lost his mainstream scientific
career largely over this audacious, ultimately inconclusive bid to establish and
document for scientific validation “communication with a nonhuman mind” (xi).
In that effort, however, he mobilized the best available tools, a cutting-edge array
of cybernetic concepts. He leaned heavily on the information theory bound up
with first-order cybernetics and operated with heuristic computational metaphors
alongside the actual computers of his era. As I will elicit through some close
readings of his texts, in that process Lilly also homed in on crucial
epistemological renovations with a constructivist redescription of cognition that
may have influenced and motivated his colleague von Foerster’s more renowned
formulations, arriving in the early 1970s at a second-order cybernetics.4 In
subsequent decades the discourse of second-order cybernetics —epitomized in the
concept of autopoiesis—would provide Niklas Luhmann’s social systems theory a
conceptual base for its own discourse of communication. I will call upon
Luhmann’s work at times to compare with Lilly’s earlier cybernetic discourse of
communication. Embedded in the cetology of The Mind of the Dolphin, then, is an
exotic anthropology of 1960s cybernetics, centered on an overburdened notion of
communication.5
Penetration
Much of the weight Lilly rested on his discourse of communication in The Mind
of the Dolphin came from therapeutic concerns inculcated by his medical and
4
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psychoanalytic trainings. This background informed his presentation of research
into interspecies communication as administering to goals of individual and
collective mental health with cures for human pathologies of communication. For
instance: “one’s own beliefs below his usual levels of awareness prevent complete
communication with self and with other persons. Our species has not achieved
equality of communication. . . . Communication with other peoples fails; we have
international conflicts in most of the world” (xiii). However, the very breadth of
Lilly’s discourse of communication generated its own problems of equivocation,
and ultimately, of conceptual overreach. In the remark just above, “complete
communication” would indicate not just serviceable understandings concerning
basic social matters of shared concern. Rather, such “completion” ought to issue
in an “equality” of agreement or consensus to the point of complete mutual
understanding or spiritual communion. As social systems theory would lead one
to expect, the overdetermined ideality of communication in Lilly’s treatment
fomented equivocal oscillations between psychic and social references, amplified
by putting “mind” and “communication” into such tight tandem without adequate
conceptual means to account for their differentiation.
While ideals such as “equality of communication” underscored the liberal
humanism residing in Lilly’s overt scientific rationales, they also indicated the
difficulties built into his dream of equality for interspecies communication. For a
bona fide “penetration” to occur, nothing less than an articulate exchange of
interspecies intimacies would really do, and until that moment arrived, on the
human end his research team could only keep faith in the hope that their project
was possible:
If and when dolphins and we do establish communication on a
highly abstract level, the proof will become obvious and
incontestable. In this book I give some of the details of this
developing picture and give the reasons why we, the ones who
work with them, must rely for some time on our faith in their
intelligence. This faith is in the working hypothesis that both we
and they are intelligent enough to break the interspecies
communication barrier between these very different minds. (84;
emphasis in the original)
Lilly’s supersonic metaphor of the “interspecies communication barrier” offered
an inappropriately material or physical image for the immaterial operational
closures of the autopoietic systems that would have to be successfully coupled
(not “broken” or “penetrated”) to yield the expanded social system that would
result from an actual episode of interspecies communication. But what this
metaphor did capture is the pathos of “penetration” when the object to be opened
up is not precisely palpable—is not a brain, but a mind.
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Let us pause to recall that Lilly began his scientific career as a
neurophysiologist developing penetrative techniques for behavioral research on
mammalian brains, culminating in papers of the later 1950s such as “Learning
Elicited by Electrical Stimulation of Subcortical Regions in the Unanesthetized
Monkey,” and “Learning Motivated by Subcortical Stimulation: The ‘Start’ and
‘Stop’ Patterns of Behavior.” As communication researcher John Shiga explains:
“In these experiments, Lilly inserted electrodes into various regions of a
monkey’s brain, sent electric current through the electrode, and recorded the
animal’s behavior and its neurological activity. The implanted electrodes enabled
Lilly to map neural networks and to link sensory events, muscle movements and
other behaviors to patterns of activity in those networks.”6 The goal, then, to
“scientifically penetrate into the area of at least one nonhuman mind” marks a
transition from neurophysiological materiality to psychological intangibility. This
metaphysical trend is uttered through a metaphorical statement, heavily laden
with material-physiological connotations, not for the actual piercing of a material
sheath or organic membrane but for the effective elaboration of a virtual
communication medium by which to couple two different species in “complete”
communication at a fully abstract level of meaning construction.
Projection
In Lilly’s efforts to craft not only theories but also experimental protocols for
“complete communication” with dolphins, one difficulty was to establish the
requisite controls against an observer’s misconstruing a random instance of
cetacean phonation as a humanly meaningful abstract utterance. For human
beings generally as well, “this problem of projection blocks a large fraction of
true communication” (3). Projection short-circuits a proper understanding of what
others are thinking or meaning to convey when they make a communicative offer.
However, the paradox built into Lilly’s experimental situation can be said to take
this form: unless you’ve already succeeded in communicating, you can’t even
know the status of your attempts. Or again, without communication having
already been established, how is one to ask the dolphin to confirm if one has
understood it correctly the first time? Yet it would seem that in relation to
interspecies communication, the problem of projection cannot be circumvented, it
can only be controlled for by a trial-and-error protocol maintained at the human
end until the moment arrives when the dolphin itself begins to assist in the
correction process:
We use the following working hypotheses in our communication
research with dolphins: The airborne whistles and the airborne
6
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clicks are attempts to communicate with us as they do with one
another, i.e., attempts to induce us to use their mode of
communication. . . . Their humanoid sounds in air are their
approximations to our communication sounds as distorted by their
hearing and by their phonation apparatus. . . . With the humanoid
sounds, dolphins are attempting to communicate with us in our
mode of communication. (83; emphases in the original)
In his Theory of Society, Luhmann draws out the immanent improbability of any
communication whatsoever. He notes that the extreme contingency of
communicative success “is hardly ever posed so drastically” as one finds in his
treatment of the topic: “the fact that a system of society actually exists and
reproduces communication through communication . . . is extremely improbable.
Only communication makes itself probable. . . . If the individual components of
communication [information, utterance, understanding] are in themselves
improbable, their synthesis is all the more so” (1:113-14). Applying Luhmann’s
theoretical descriptions to Lilly’s project, the higher improbability of interspecies
communication would also follow from the higher incommensurability of alien
psychic systems, the radical difference of which would tend to deter the formation
of any medium of meaning to which a hybrid, interspecies social system could
couple itself such that human and dolphin individuals could arrive at
commensurate understandings of communicative offers. And here again is a
formulation of the Catch-22 or logical quandary in which Lilly’s project is caught:
only interspecies communication could make interspecies communication
probable. In the human instance, the communications produced by social systems
have had eons to evolve in coevolutionary step with neurological and psychic
systems. Can the formation of an interspecies social system really be jumpstarted
in a few weeks or years, especially when one species is landborne and the other
aquatic? Talk about the improbability of communication! Lilly’s immanently
improbable effort can proceed only on the prayers (since while any conclusive
evidence for these assumptions may be “developing,” it has not yet arrived) that
the nonhuman beings to be communicated with are comparably communicative
within their own societal forms, and moreover, that interspecies communication is
not just possible but desired on both sides of the potential exchange. In other
words, to gain any traction at all, Lilly must force the issue. His project must be
built on the projection of its desired outcome:
We must keep the working hypothesis in mind that “they are
highly intelligent and are just as interested in communicating with
us as we are with them.”. . . If we use any other hypothesis, we
have no success whatsoever in dealing communicatively with
them. This hypothesis seems to be necessary and even overriding
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to accomplish the kinds of communication we are accomplishing
and attempting to expand. The proof, the incontrovertible truth,
that they are interested in this communication is developing slowly
and carefully in our laboratory. (83)
And in any event, as Lilly goes on to assert, the mechanism behind the
problem of projection—the psychic generation of mental models—is also at the
root of cognition altogether. In line with the cybernetic vogue of the 1960s, Lilly
endows that central mechanism with a fully mechanistic description.
Complementing his implicitly cybernetic focus on communication, Lilly
introduces an explicit computational analogue for the mammalian brain. Like a
computer programmed to simulate a real-world process, that brain generates
models for the mind to use, and at times, misuse. Addressing the matter of
projection, he asks “How do we do this wishful, false realizing? Our relatively
large minds (brains) act as computers that can make models inside themselves of
other human minds and their activities” (3). Now, social systems theory would
redescribe the matter of projection in a post-computational manner, as a normal
problem set of observation and attribution for operationally closed meaning
systems. Projection is a momentary or prolonged negation of internal or selfreference in favor of an uncorroborated external or hetero-referential attribution.
Moreover, in first-order observation, self-reference is blocked as a matter of
course.7 That is, psychic events arise altogether as internal or systemic selections
that the mind can check for referential consistency only by participating in society
and thus enabling others to form and communicate second-order observations as
corrective or affirmative responses to one’s own utterances.
Returning to Lilly’s psychic cybernetics, we are informed that only
specific areas of the brain are “hard wired” for specific tasks, while much of it is
“general purpose”: this readiness for variable programming “is the saving grace
which allows one individual to communicate with another. . . . The important
common power is the ability of this brain to assume the tasks of making models
of creatures and persons in its surrounds. This is the fundamental property which
allows communication to take place” (7). Lilly bases this theorization of
communication upon a loosely specified ability of the brain to “take on” the
commonality of communication’s semiotic medium—language: “We can develop
and share a language among uniquely different individuals because each of those
individuals can take on enough of the commonality of language within his own
brain to allow communication” (7). And yet the commonality of language
immediately runs up against the privacy of thought: “But we must never forget
that the thinking processes of the individual are still uniquely his or hers. Only
7
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certain aspects are common and shared” (7). Which aspects? Well, language. Lilly
does the best he can with the psycholinguistics he has at hand, but his theory
cannot break out of the mere circularity of these formulations. Still, his intuition
for the closure of consciousness is properly presented. Lilly rightly insists on the
impossibility of penetrating to the possession of a fellow human’s thoughts: “We
may have the illusion of penetrating completely into the mental life of another
human being through language, but this is impossible. Each of us is so uniquely
different and so uniquely himself that we cannot yet so penetrate” (7). And these
considerations of the limits of human knowledge are then to be pointed toward the
problem of the absolutely alien mind of the dolphin.
As we have already noted, the theoretical penetration of the mind of the
dolphin Lilly introduced in his preface does not mean any material or spiritual
seizure of its contents but rather, simply but decisively, the establishment of a
relation of communication. Any mind is black-boxed, self-possessed of an
inviolable mental privacy whose only inlets and outlets depend upon events of
communicative reception and utterance. It is in this context that Lilly obliquely
introduces into his dolphin discourse the deep background of his experimentation
with the isolation tank.8
No one wants to be insulated and isolated for long from his fellow
human beings. In experiments in which I have isolated volunteer
subjects and in experiences in which others have isolated
themselves, it is shown that the major need that develops in the
isolation experience is transactions with others, i.e.,
communication. This need can be temporarily satisfied by
hallucinating and talking to the “projected” persons in the
solitudinous surroundings. (8)
With this allusion to the isolation tank, the topic of projection recurs in his
text not as a pathology of communication but rather as a sort of involuntary
protective reflex, an affective-ideational immune response. The isolation tank
provides a literal materialization of the operational closure of the psychic system,
momentarily structurally decoupled from any possibility of “true”
communication. When you are in the tank, no one can hear you communicate.
And so, hallucinatory projection provides an emergency solution to the terrors of
extreme isolation by intuiting companionship to counter the momentary
impossibility of communication. In Lilly’s cybernetic idiom, and especially as
induced by immersion within an isolation tank, hallucinations are particular
projective phenomena that compute internal models of outer things and then insert
8
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them into a larger model of the mind’s external environment. The mind in
artificial isolation invents and populates its own world, similar to or different than
the world outside the tank, but in any event without recourse to the usual
consistency checks of actual communication.
Self-Reference
If Lilly himself were to be the first human explorer to make contact across the
species boundary to the mind of the dolphin, he could not at the same time stand
outside the circuit of communication he hoped to achieve. In his current
experimental sphere of sentient encounter between large-brained mammals, any
traditional methodological move to remove himself from the stage of his
experimental theater would create “paradoxes. Man himself must be included.
The scientist himself must be in his system” (28). Lilly’s statement anticipates the
self-referential turn that second-order cybernetics will soon generalize to all
occasions of observation. But by acknowledging the experimenter’s presence
within the system to be observed, he is not so much escaping from paradox as
presciently engaging with the basal paradox of observing systems as that will be
codified in second-order systems theory.9 From the positivist point of view of
normal science, of course, Lilly draws paradox to himself just by entering the
circle of his own experiment and so collapsing any stance of objective
detachment. Nonetheless, Lilly remained fastidious in maintaining an awareness
of methodological distinction between hetero- and self-reference, in this instance,
between “fact and theory”: “In my work as a generalist, I use the model of the
physicists and their separation rule. I separate the fact and theory rigorously in my
own mind. In addition, experimenter and the parts of himself functioning in the
system under investigation are separated as far as is practical” (29). Nonetheless,
in order to perform this notional separation he can only step once more into the
circle of paradox, holding together in his own person the unity of the distinction
between self- and hetero-observation.
Lilly’s observational paradox is only compounded in this text written for a
general audience by his desire both to share and to guard the revelatory
experiences that are backstage-managing the self-referential renovations to his
scientific practice:
If one succeeds in having a religious revelation, the significance is
steeped in a perspective so vast as to generate an awe from which
9
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he cannot recover. . . . Such experiences are not yet admitted to the
halls of conventional science. A major difficulty is that unless
another person has had such experience, he cannot share the
wonder and the awe of one’s own inner experiences. . . . The truth
of what one presents is not subject to the usual tests of evidence as
devised in the courts and the sciences. (35-36)
Although unspoken as yet in this text, Lilly labors here to contain his LSD
experiences, begun in 1964, within the proprieties of standard objective discourse.
Communication of this sort is another problem constituted by the closure of
individual experience, especially for those private experiences that permanently
alter one’s relation to the world. Understanding of the revelatory information that
he could utter greatly depends on the mental and experiential preparation of its
recipient. In this manner the problematics of interspecies and intraspecies
communication intersect.
One rhetorical strategy Lilly develops in this text for rendering impersonal
information about himself is his recourse, however strained, to a third-person
stance. Another such strategy—concurrently undergoing full development in
Programming and Metaprogramming in the Human Biocomputer—is the
coupling of that expository voice to an idiom and conceptual allegory steeped in
cybernetics. Channeling his personal experiences and theoretical stances through
the affectless tones of classical computerese nicely induces a scientistic flattening
of the delivery. For instance:
In this theoretical view which we are generating, theories are
analogous to computer metaprograms. One’s own brain is
analogous to a huge computer larger than any built today. The
theories (programs and metaprograms) stored in one’s self operate
the way a stored program in a modern computer operates. The
stored program gives the orders for the data acquisition, the
computations to be done, the logic to be used, the models to
employ, the new models to be constructed, the end use of the
results, and the outputs to be chosen to carry out the end uses.
Thus, to test a given theory, one “programs” himself with the ascomplete-as-possible theory and joins the system under
investigation as a participant-computer operating “on line.” (92)
The self-referential element returns in the self-programming of the “scientist in
the system” as a “participant computer” running a theoretical metaprogram to be
put to the experimental test in real time. If one discounts the earnest intentions at
play in this edgy science, Lilly might as well be composing a posthuman strain of
performance art. Let us call it experimental performance science, in which, in this
cybernetic milieu, the experimenter self-fashions himself not just as a participant
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observer but as a computational device coupled into the system to be observed,
open to on-line learning and real-time reprogramming and, as prophylaxis against
projection, impervious to emotional distraction: “one streamlines himself for the
program. If one is going to be a participant computer, he must get rid of excess
emotional baggage. Excessive guilt has to be eliminated. Personal blind spots and
tender pain-shame areas must be changed or erased. The model of the computer
itself which one is striving for contains no personal blocks against finding the
truth no matter where it lies” (95).
Redefining Information
Chapter 4 of The Mind of the Dolphin is titled “Communication Is between
Minds.” The crucial distinction implied by this statement is that communication is
not merely between brains. It is not simply a matter of sequential sensoryneurological transmissions and receptions. The threshold of mind arrives with the
higher-order computations that allow for metaprogramming and general-purpose
modeling. The definition of communication now receiving explicit statement
works backward from this distinction of mind:
Definition: Communication is the exchange of information between
two or more minds. (99)
Nonetheless, as the term “exchange” indicates, Lilly’s scheme of communication
comes out of an informatic matrix still wedded to a data-transmission model. Lilly
provides a diagram directly adapting the famous diagram of a communication
system in Warren Weaver’s introduction to his and Claude Shannon’s
Mathematical Theory of Communication.10 Nonetheless, key differences emerge
from their comparison. The interest for us will be in the ways that Lilly, for one,
finesses classical information theory in order to open up a conceptual residence
for mind (an entity seldom elicited in standard informatic discourse), and for
another, provides some preliminary sketches for a constructivist epistemology.

10
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Communication,” in Warren Weaver and Claude Shannon, The Mathematical Theory
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Figure 1 – John Lilly’s Schema of the Definition of Communication in The Mind of the
Dolphin

Regarding his schema of communication, Lilly explains: “This
This diagram shows a
mind (M) on the left in the circle contained in brain 1 (the square) transmitting
signals to mind (M) in the circle on the right contained within brain 2, the square.
In turn, mind 2 is sending signals to mind 1” (102). Compare Warren Weaver’s
diagram of information transmission:

Figure 2 – Warren Weaver’s diagram of information transmission from The
Mathematical Theory of Communication

Information theory per se is oriented to technological systems. Weaver’s diagram
is modeled on a telephone system and focuses on signal conversion, signal load,
and signal loss, for which depiction a one
one-way
way transmission suffices. Lilly’s
diagram is ostensibly
ibly oriented to embodied minds and depicts a minimal social
system—in
in Luhmann’s idiom, an interaction system. At the same time, his brainbrain
mind composites are also, at least in the heuristics of his theory, biocomputers,
biocomputers
and this psychophysiology comes forward in a strongly cybernetic frame. Thus
Lilly’s diagram can be unfolded toward Shannon and Weaver’s technological
scheme by momentarily positing the mind in brain 1 as the information source,
the mind in brain 2 as th
thee destination, and brains 1 and 2 as the neurological
aspects of signal transmission and reception respectively. However, as Lilly
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operates his diagram, the key turn is this: “The information is not generated from
these signals until the signals are received, computed, and turned into the
information by each of the minds in turn. This is the essential core of our
definition of communication” (102-3).
Purveying a common equivocation in communication theory, what Lilly
here terms information is more precisely the meanings constructed by either mind
as a result of their social “exchange.” Since he is still working in a first-order
informatic idiom, Lilly deploys an equivalent distinction between “signal” and
“information.” However, in importing the brain-mind couple into the informatic
diagram, and in drawing a circle around mind relative to the brain, Lilly’s scheme
adumbrates a constructivist or second-order distinction between information and
meaning. Perhaps I am projecting what I want to find, but it seems to me that by
introducing mind into his scheme and so “placing new boundaries on information
theory” (105), Lilly’s biocomputational model posits a strong anticipation of the
operational boundaries to be codified in Luhmann’s metabiotic appropriation of
autopoiesis for the production of consciousness and communication in psychic
and social systems:
The information does not exist as information until it is within the
higher levels of abstraction of each of the minds and computed as
such. . . . Information is the result of a long series of computations
based on data signal inputs, data signal transmissions to the brain
substance, and recomputations of these data. . . . The schema of
the definition shows that one must differentiate very carefully
between “signals” and “information.” In this view, a set of signals
. . . is not information; it becomes so only if and when it enters, is
computed, and changes the contents of a mind. . . . In other words,
our boundary for information is at a level of discourse of Cogito
ergo sum, “I think (or I know), therefore I am.” Information is that
which I know now, coming from outside me, and coming from the
storage inside me, allowing for delays in computation and in
transmission. . . . The mind of the observer-participant is where the
information is constructed, by and through his own programs, his
own rules of perception, his own cognitive and logical processes,
his own metaprogram of priorities among programs. (103-4;
emphases in the original)
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The Signal-Noise Ratio
With the inscription of the “observer-participant” into the interactive construction
of meaningful information for communicative exchange between minds, Lilly
now elicits the component of informatic noise left over from the Warren Weaver
diagram of information flow. But unlike their simple addition of a noise source to
signal transmission, Lilly imports and distributes information theory’s
signal/noise ratio across his scheme of communication: “the signal/noise ratio is a
definable entity only when each of two minds agrees on the definition of what is
‘signal’ and what is ‘noise’” (105).11 However, having underscored that
communication demands social agreement on how to distinguish meaningful
forms from the randomness of their medium, Lilly now focuses on the individual
mind’s self-generation of meaning forms, and his train of exposition arrives once
more at the station of physical isolation inducing psychic projection as a source of
mental formations. Given a prolonged contemplation of a noisy process, one may
begin to “‘make signals out of the noise’ by introducing systematic changes into
the noise. In profound physical isolation, this process can be shown most
dramatically. Our minds project a pattern onto the noise. . . . Basically,
investigators who are looking into their own minds (under special conditions)
may mistake the sources of ‘new’ information within their own minds as if those
sources were outside the head. This process in psychology is called ‘projection’”
(105-6).
In the context of the research protocols for the scientific practices under
discussion in The Mind of the Dolphin, once again, projection is basically a
problem, not simply insofar as it may corrupt the experiential data being collected
and examined, but also insofar as one may be tempted to contemplate a
hypothesis that hallucinated messages are in fact offers of communication arriving
through unknown, immaterial channels. Here in some of the weirdest passages of
this text, Lilly darkly intimates, although in the mode of rational negation, that
communication with dolphins could conceivably occur—especially if all efforts at
normal symbolic exchange yield a null result—through a paranormal or telepathic
medium:
If one is watching “noise” at the logical level, he can sometimes
“hear messages,” as if he were being spoken to by other persons
and these persons were telling him some important message…
11

Lilly’s exposition of noise makes his equation between meaning and information
explicit: “In the standard theory, ‘noise’ . . . is a form of energy in which no part can be
taken, no matter how chosen, as conveying any meaning whatsoever. Physical noise is
that set of signals which, when received by a mind, generates no new information in
that mind” (105).
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Fundamentally, then, we must eliminate, insofar as our brains and
minds and their scientific investigation are concerned, a hypothesis
which says that the noise coming from inside one’s own mind and
brain can be “signals caused by direct mental influence of other
minds without the interposition of the usual modes and media of
communication.” (106)
Lilly continues for a number of pages in this vein of the logical dismissal of as
well as denial of evidence for uncanny communication, ostensibly to underscore
the comprehensive reach of his theorizations and rigor of his experimental
procedures. He arrives at a declaration of practical agnosticism: “My own position
about religion is the same as my position about ESP [“extra-sensory perception”]
and thought transference. Until I have empirical, down-to-earth, hard-nosed
information thrust upon me, I will maintain a position of not knowing; such
thinking also belongs in the area of the unknown” (110).
Nonetheless, at this point in the text a reader could still wonder why Lilly
wants to take his discussion on a long detour into such outlandish matters. The
Mind of the Dolphin does not really answer that question, although a bit later, in
chapter 5, the essential clue is given when Lilly provides a short work-up of the
parallel research project that has been moving in and out of focus between the
lines of this text. Now shifting into a first-person narration, he remarks that “after
many exposures to the physical isolation under ideal physical conditions, I was
able to overcome self-created mental discomfort to a certain extent. I learned a
lesson about our minds as follows: Our huge computers are, to a certain extent,
self-metaprogramming and self-programming” (121). Right here Lilly provided a
footnote to an early version of the second book-length text he completed in 1967.
This was the obligatory final research report composed at the conclusion of his
five-year Career Award from the National Institutes of Mental Health (NIMH),
which award had been largely financing the CRI since 1962. In Lilly’s footnote,
the title is given as The Human Biocomputer: Programming and
Metaprogramming (Theory and Experiments with LSD-25).12
An extended consideration of this major intertext must wait for another
occasion. Instead, by way of conclusion for the moment, I will move directly to a
section of Programming and Metaprogramming that overlaps some key topics we
have been tracking through the discourse of communication in The Mind of the
Dolphin. In particular, we will look at some passages from chapter 8, “Basic
Effects of LSD-25 on the Biocomputer: Noise as the Basic Energy for Projection
12

Lilly addresses this work’s “curious history” in his 1972 foreword to the second edition
of Programming and Metaprogramming in the Human Biocomputer: Theory and
Experiments (New York: Bantam, 1974), v. I will quote the text from this 1974 edition.
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Techniques.” The wording of the title indicates the crux of the difference between
the two treatments. In the dolphin book, invested in the maintenance of a baseline
of normal scientificity, projection is presented primarily if not entirely as a source
of aberration in the data collected, a problem factor to be controlled. But what
Lilly discovered and subsequently explored in the isolation work was that,
depending on the kind of experiment one had in mind, projection need not be
controlled for but simply itself controlled as a research technique. All the more so
under the radical suggestibility induced by LSD, projection offered a
phenomenological resource that could itself be “programmed” and so tested
experimentally for the purpose of sounding the limits of possible belief.
In the following passages from Programming and Metaprogramming,
Lilly adverts to the signal/noise ratio, but with some major differences. Whereas
in the dolphin book, the noise source was located “in the external world . . . by
either looking at a very noisy visually presented process or by listening to a very
noisy acoustically presented process” (105), in the biocomputer text, the noise
source is fully internalized. It is in fact the form of the contribution LSD makes,
an amplification of “the noise level of the mind itself” (82):
In the analysis of the effects of LSD-25 on the human mind, a
reasonable hypothesis states that the effect of these substances on
the human computer is to introduce white noise (in the sense of
randomly varying energy containing no signals of itself) in specific
systems in the computer. . . . The major operative principle seems
to be that the human computer operates in such a way as to
make signals out of noise and thus to create information out of
random energies where there was no signal; this is the
“projection principle”; noise is creatively used in non-noise
models. (80-82; emphasis in the original).
Later on the same page Lilly introduces a long passage from a 1962 paper by
Heinz von Foerster, “Bio-Logic,” in order to cite the latter’s argument for the
hypothesis that some percentage “‘of all operations in the brain are afflicted with
an intrinsic noise figure which has to be taken care of in one way or another’”
(83).13 But let us also jump forward for a moment to von Foerster’s justly famous
1974 paper “On Constructing a Reality,” to sample what may be its own
reciprocating of Lilly’s attention. A section on “Computation” ends with the
observation that “In ‘biological computers’ the programs may themselves be
computed on. This leads to the concepts of ‘metaprograms,’ ‘meta13

Lilly cites from Heinz von Foerster, “Bio-Logic,” in Biological Prototypes and
Synthetic Systems, volume 1, eds. Eugene E. Bernard and Morley R. Kare (New York:
Plenum Press, 1962), 1-12.
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metaprograms,’ and so on. This, of course, is the consequence of the inherent
recursive organization of these systems” (224). The following section on
“Closure” formulates a “postulate of cognitive homeostasis” that reads like a
straightforward generalization of the bio-computational principle underlying the
statements Lilly’s text placed in bold font above. Von Foerster writes: “The
nervous system is organized (or organizes itself) so that it computes a stable
reality” (225).
The postulate of cognitive homeostasis would of course hold, as much as
may be possible, under relatively extreme conditions such as LSD’s amplification
of the white noise perceived by the mind amidst any other signals. And so, as
Lilly lists off the basic effects of LSD-25 on the biocomputer, “One can thus
‘explain’ the apparent speed-up of subjective time; the enhancement of colors and
detail in perceptions of the real world; the production of illusions; . . . the
projection of emotional expression onto other real persons; the synesthesia of
music to visual projections; the feeling of ‘oneness with the universe’; apparent
ESP effects; communications from ‘beings other than humans’” (80). While
caution over seduction by misconstrued projections remains, in Programming and
Metaprogramming the projection process itself becomes an openly and openendedly self-experimental technique, a voluntary search for the limits of mental
experience that the adept metaprogrammer of one’s own biocomputer (brain) can
induce: “One can . . . detect the noise level of the mind itself and use it for
cognitional projections rather than sense-organ-data projections” (82).
Put another way, projection is a problem only if the goal being sought is
communication in an interaction system, such as that constellated by the
interspecies effort. In the end, communication research with dolphins ran aground
against its own improbability, not to mention Lilly’s increasingly precipitous loss
of institutional support as the outlandish aspects of his dolphin work came to
loom larger than its initial promise and appealing pathos.14 Once Lilly turned the
“projection principle” from a side-effect into a primary technique for selfexperimentation on the limits of belief, the matter of communication was no
longer the object of the science but simply the process of its symbolicallymediated presentation beyond the self. If Lilly’s proactive treatment of
“cognitional projections” upon the noise of the mind directly anticipated some
aspects of von Foerster’s mature contribution to the discourse of systems theory,
the epistemological constructivism of second-order cybernetics, it did so in an
activist mode of psychic exploration, a mode that the necessary protocols of
communication research could only hinder and impede. Ever the intellectual
sophisticate, von Foerster successfully moderated and streamlined the more outré
14

For copious detail on this score, see Burnett, Sounding of the Whale, chapter 6.
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elements of his friend Lilly’s psychonautical adventures, extracting their gist and
making it eventually into a resource for social systems theory’s autopoietic
coupling of the discourses of consciousness and communication.
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